PART 1
PART 2
PART 3
PART 4 \u200b\u200b
PART 5
On 7 October 2001 American bombing began against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden and his top aides, refugees in the country. A month after the ground offensive of the Northern Alliance caused the collapse of Taliban resistance. Enclaves of the regime as Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar fell without much resistance and 13 November the Alliance entered Kabul.
Quick Despite this victory, the Americans did not achieve the ultimate objective of its intervention in Afghanistan: the capture of Osama Bin Laden and his closest collaborators, described by intelligence as the high-value targets (HVT) of the war. In December escaped from Tora Bora, where they were virtually surrounded.
And in January 2002 the situation was repeated in ZHAW Kili, managed to escape the siege of the Allied forces.
Refugees in the rugged mountains of eastern Afghanistan, near the border with Pakistan, the capture of the leaders of Al Qaeda was problematic for the support offered to them Pashtuns.
Given the difficulties in using human intelligence in place, the area was subjected to intensive surveillance with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and photographs satellite.
From the analysis of the images received, in March 2002, intelligence indicated the possible presence of high-value targets in the Shahi-Kot Valley. There could be Osama Bin Laden, his second Ayman Al - Zawahiri and Taliban leader Mullah Omar.
The Taliban troops and al-Qaeda that protected the valley is estimated at 150-200 Islamist guerrillas. The valley was, therefore, the most gorgeous goal could occur and immediately orchestrated a plan to gain control of the Shahi-Kot Valley and catch the HVT.
The code name was Operation Anaconda, and command fell to General Franklin L. Hagenback, former commander of the 10th Mountain Division, which would take operational control from Bagram Air Base
The plan was to operate through two Task Force (TF) or groupings of forces. TF
Hammer: Hammer, would infiltrate into the Valley at different points, looking for contact with the enemy to put to flight. TF
Anvil: Anvil, remain blocked exits the valley, so that the Islamist guerrillas and HVT not find escape routes.
was to be a quick operation, a maximum of 72 hours of fighting, given the small number of Islamist opposition was estimated as: no more than 200 guerrillas against a deployment Coalition of over 2,000 men.
TF Hammer: under the command of Lt. Col. Pete Blaber, consisted of:
- Several groups of American Special Forces and elements of Delta Force and SEALs.
- Elements of the British Royal Marines, the 3rd Battalion, Canadian and Australian SAS Regiment.
- and 450 specially trained Afghan soldiers in Khost camp to work with American special forces under the command of Gen. Zia Lodin. TF
Yunque, was composed of:
- 3rd Brigade of the 101 Division Air Assault, from Colonel Frank Wiercinski, which shut out of the valley to the north and east (Pakistan border)
- 1st Battalion, 87 Regiment (1 / 87) of the 10 th Mountain Division, Lt. Colonel Paul Lacamera, which shut out the South Valley
Air Support:
- Unit AC-130 Air Force
- Apache helicopters of the aviation brigade
3101
The Combined Air Operations Centre was only informed Details of Operation Anaconda the day before the start, so had no time to organize additional air support. If in the course of Operation growing need for air support would have trouble filling quickly.
March 1, 2002: Day D-1
The Hammer TF outposts infiltrated the valley to establish observation points. These outposts consisted of three special operations teams:
Juliet and India, the Delta Force, who took positions in the north and south of the valley
Mako 31, of Seal, which established an observation post in central valley .
Very few data we have on this initial phase of operation (Day D-1) given the highly secret all proceedings of SEAL and Delta Force, but it is known that the first contact with the enemy occurred was because Mako 31 detected the location of a heavy machine gun DShK, positioned so that it could reach the MH-47 Chinook helicopter when they entered the valley to enter the first wave of troops.
The Seal approached the gun emplacement and eliminated their servers with total stealth.
March 2, 2002: D Day
effective at midnight began TF Hammer taking land from MH-47 Chinook helicopters.
same input occurred in the Valley shot a column of vehicles carrying on board an A-Team Special Forces (Texas 14/ODA 594) and a contingent of Afghan soldiers Zia Lodin. Due to the steepness of the road several cars were an accident, there were some injuries and for this purpose are lit lanterns, which was put on a semblance to the guerrillas. He missed the element of surprise was lost. But the first American casualties were not caused by the reaction of the Islamist guerrillas, but friendly fire.
The group led by Sergeant Major Stanley L. Harriman's Third Special Forces Group moving in the night stand at the point of observation assigned when they were detected from the air by an AC-130. Due to an error in the inertial navigation system of the aircraft the crew concluded that the group had detected infantry moved through an area which was not expected that U.S. troops scour and thus wrongly identified them as the enemy and opened fire them.
Sergeant Harriman died on the spot and several of his men were wounded. Apart
Texas group firing 14 and Harriman, the rest of TF Hammer was set in its pre-assault positions around 0615 hours where they had to wait for the start of preparatory air bombardment. It was envisaged that that bombardment lasted 55 minutes, but was much less. There were communication problems with Texas 14, the command could not establish with certainty its location, and for fear of aerial bombing reached them he dropped six bombs.
This lack of air support not only diminished the cause desired effect on Islamist guerrillas, but demoralized Afghan soldiers of the Alliance.
At sunrise the Texas convoy of 14 vehicles was hit with mortar fire by guerrillas, suffering at least forty dead and wounded casualties.
All TF Hammer was found to face an unexpected combination of heavy machine guns and mortars, air support and small. Meanwhile TF
Yunque went into action at H Hour, 06:30 hours, the helicopters landed the first wave of troops from the 101 Air Assault and 10 th Mountain along the edges North, East and south of the valley to fill the positions allocated block. Almost immediately came under heavy enemy fire from mortars.
By now it was clear that the enemy force initially estimated at 150-200 Islamist guerrillas actually consisted of between 500 and 1000 men, well entrenched in the highlands of the valley.
troops 1 / 87 in the landing zones of the south held the brunt of the fight. Sergeant Andrzej There
Ropel led his platoon under fire up a hill. Ropel was able to kill the enemy observer guided mortar fire from their position and provided the 1 / 87 recognition of the surrounding terrain. This observation allowed us to detect the position of a 120 mm mortar and guide the Apache attack helicopters on this and other targets. Thank
Ropel shown in the Apache attack was devastating. In the zone assigned to 1 / 87 The Americans suffered 28 wounded, but no deaths. In contrast there were over 100 guerrillas killed. Sergeant Ropel
received the Bronze Star.
Across the valley special operations teams that had infiltrated the previous day led air strikes.
Air Command diverted the Shahi-Kot Valley of equipment which could muster, and throughout the day made its appearance on the Valle aircraft B-1, B-52, F-15 and F-16.
The Australian SAS was also the hero of the day: Martin Jock Wallace, who won the Medal of Valor for Australia maintained its position for twelve hours of fighting until he could be evacuated.
March 3, 2002: Day D +1
Throughout the whole day in the Valley were exchanges of fire between forces and the guerrillas infiltrated with sporadic incursions of American aviation.
The tenacious guerrilla resistance led to the American reinforcements sent.
Late in the afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Command Blaber received notice that two SEAL teams, Mako Mako 30 and 21, arrived by helicopter for immediate infiltration in the Shahi-Kot Valley in order to establish an observation point peak Takur Ghar, a hill overlooking the valley.
The Seal asked that the helicopters took ground almost at the very top, in a possible landing zone (LZ) on the eastern side, but it discouraged Blaber and opted for another LZ located at 1,300 meters from the top.
The Seal aim was to reach the summit before dawn but one of two MH-47 Chinook transport had to be mechanical problems and had to be replaced, causing a significant delay. If you used the recommended LZ Blaber could not reach the top of Takur Ghar before sunrise, so the Seal
chose to use the LZ of the eastern slope.
As a precaution, an AC-130 inspected the peak and found no enemy activity, but remained in the area, was taken to support other units before the insertion of the Seal.
March 4, 2002: Day D +2
When the helicopter carrying 21 Mako was already in the vicinity of the LZ was hit by an RPG on the left side. The helicopter did not fall down, could stay in the air but due to the loss of maneuverability had to start back without taking land.
then realized that one of the Seal and was not on board. Sergeant (Petty Officer First Class) Neil Roberts fell out through the open ramp.
The helicopter could not return to the top to find it had such impact damage could barely kept under control and had to make a forced landing about four miles from where Roberts had fallen. The Seal was immediately put in place in search of Roberts, but took two hours to travel the four miles. Two F-15 flying over them constantly to give them some protection.
The other helicopter, which carried the team Mako 30, went to where the sergeant had fallen and the Seal inserted here to look for him. It was a very risky decision: they landed under fire and was fatally Sergeant John A. Chapman. Two others were wounded Seal Mako 30 and he was so depleted and facing many enemies who requested urgent assistance from the quick reaction force based at Bagram: 19 Rangers under the command of Captain Nate Self transported in two chinook.
When the two helicopters with the Rangers came to Takur Ghar was the 6:10 and it was morning. One of the Chinook was hit by a RPG in the right engine and fell down. The guerrillas then attacked vigorously the unit dropped to annihilate all the occupants and the intense firefight that followed managed to kill the sergeants Phillip Svitak and Brad Crose, and soldiers and Marc Anderson Matt Commons.
The situation was very rushed, but the other could deposit chinook Rangers no casualties to fifteen minutes later, reuniédnose total of 26 men.
One of them, the Air Force Sergeant Gabe Brown, a flight controller aboard the downed Chinook, noted for his skill in directing the fire of air support provided by F-15. pilots had no experience in that kind of action, but Brown was able to guide them until they ran out of ammunition.
Over 14 hours, until sunset allowing air evacuation, the Rangers, the Seal who joined them later and crew the downed Chinook continuous engagement against the guerrillas at the peak of Takur Ghar, in the course of which lost their medical officer, Major Jason Cunningham. Still did not involve helicopters, medical evacuation (medevac) because of the danger they were shot down. Very helpful
an Australian SAS team had infiltrated the area before the downing of the helicopter and they could keep their distance as observers without being detected by the guerrillas, leading aerial action. Their commander received the Bronze Star from the United States for their efficient collaboration.
A sunset, around 20:00 pm Mako Rangers and 30 were evacuated by helicopter Takur Ghar peak.
In the fight for the mountain seven American soldiers were killed and 11 wounded. Roberts is not known whether he died instantly after falling from the chinook or was killed by the guerrillas after him prisoner, but in any case was there he died.
At least 200 Islamist fighters also were killed in that mountain.
Days 5-11 March 2002:
The failure of the infiltration was Takur Ghar American Commanding rethink the situation. The chaotic and disastrous rescue mission too Neil Roberts recalled the battle of Mogadishu. As did Somalis, Afghans converged on any transport helicopter was shot down because they knew that Americans would come there to rescue his men. That meant for Americans to lose the initiative and not being able to take advantage of his superior mobility.
The U.S. command decided to change tactics in the Shahi-Kot Valley where possible to prevent further demolition and higher casualties.
Instead of operating with infantry and special operations teams infiltrate it was decided to make extensive use of UAVs, sharpshooters, Apache helicopters and shelling F-18A and B-52. Throughout the entire operation Anaconda American Air Force dropped over the Valley Shahi-Kot 2,500 bombs.
From day 10 were also incorporated into A-10 aircraft. That day operated for 15 hours. Two A-10 pilots, Lt. Col. Edward Kostelnik and Captain Scott Campbell, have credited the death of at least 200 Islamist guerrillas during Operation Anaconda.
elite shooters also had a leading role, even broke a record that remained unbeaten over the past 35 years: the fatal shooting carried out by longer distance a sniper.
Corporal Rob Furlong, Canadian using a McMillan TAC-50 rifle removed a guerrilla fired a RPK machine gun at a distance of 2,430 meters.
total of five Canadian sharpshooters received the Bronze Star U.S. Army for their involvement in Anaconda.
What at first was designed as a swift action by special operations, with the goal of capturing a high-value human targets with minimum use of force became a slow battle of attrition whose sole purpose was to kill. Kill everything. Kill and kill until there were no enemy to live in it, in fact, devoid of any relevance.
March 12, 2002: D-Day +11
After a final blitz American and Afghan forces swept through the valley from one end to another and eliminated the last pockets resistance. Operation Anaconda
initially scheduled to last three days was extended to over 11.
8 American soldiers were killed, 7 Afghan soldiers and a number of Islamist guerrillas may range between 500 and 800.
The HVT, high value targets, Osama Bin Laden and company, fled the Valley. Or maybe you were not there when the operation began.
Overall it was a monumental intelligence failure was evaluated by the magnitude of evil guerrilla presence in the area, was wrong in pointing out the whereabouts of the HVT and spent two weeks and huge resources to win a valley with no strategic value.
-reliance on the technology of aerial and satellite monitoring could substitute for human intelligence had been exposed once again. But what choice did the American Army?
Speaking to the media about Anaconda General Frank said, "almost never have perfect intelligence information, what we do is act according to the information we have, and move to the site to confirm or deny the presence of enemy forces. "
("We Will Never Have Almost perfect intelligence information, and so what we do is we take the information That We Have and we move in to confirm or deny the Presence of the enemy forces That we suspect.")
Westley Clark He added: "We must have the domain of intelligence on the battlefield, and that means human intelligence, and that means putting the boots on the ground"
("The thing is we must have for domination on the battlefield intelligence, and That Means human intelligence and That Means boots on the ground.. ")
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